Mr. President, we are well

aware that an agreement was struck

this week by the Secretary General of

the United Nations, Kofi Annan, and

the Iraqi Government, led by Saddam

Hussein, with respect to the sites that

Iraq agreed would be open to unfettered

inspection at the conclusion of

the gulf war. Let me give a little history

first.

Remember that the United States

and the allied forces were prepared to

carry the battle further, perhaps even

to Saddam Hussein himself, but the

President of the United States judged

that the battle could be called off if the

Iraqi Government would agree to a series

of commitments to abide by the

rule of law in the future. As a result,

we stopped our military campaign

against the Iraqi Army, and an agreement

was entered into between the

Iraqi Government and the allied forces

under the jurisdiction of the United

States in which the Iraqi Government

made some very specific promises. The

key promise was not to develop any

weapons of mass destruction and to destroy

everything that they had.

To implement that commitment, an

inspection regime was established, and

the Iraqi Government agreed to allow

unfettered inspection of its country in

order to assure that it was abiding by

the agreement not to develop and, indeed,

to destroy any weapons of mass

destruction that it might already have.

From the day that agreement was

signed, it has been violated repeatedly

by the Iraqi Government and Iraqi authorities,

and it has been literally, Mr.

President, a cat-and-mouse game between

the U.N. inspectors under

UNSCOM and the Iraqi Government. It

seems that unfettered inspection has

been permitted until the inspectors get

warm—like the old child’s game, ‘‘Am I

getting warm yet?’’—and as soon as the

inspectors would get warm, then there

would be delay and deception and denial

and, if it were serious enough, outright

barring of inspectors from a site

or facility until the offending material

had been whisked literally out the

back door, in some cases, and then

when the site was clean, the front door

would open, the inspectors would be invited

in and they would find, of course,

nothing. That game went on for a long

time. Finally, the U.N. inspector said,

That is when the United

States began to consider a bombing

campaign as a means of at least attempting

to degrade the weapons of

mass destruction that Iraq had developed.

A lot of people felt it probably

wouldn’t succeed because it is difficult

to find those caches of weapons, except

for the ones that were disclosed when

Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law defected

to Jordan for a while and indicated

where this material was and our inspectors

were able to go in and find it

as a result of that, Saddam Hussein all

of a sudden remembering that he had

forgotten to tell us that that existed.

Except for that instance, we have

been unsuccessful in being able to identify

much of these stocks. So it was

problematic as to whether a bombing

campaign would actually result in the

destruction of this material. As a result,

a lot of people were pushing the

administration prior to that bombing

campaign to develop a broader strategy

that would consist of a wide array of

actions that over time could result in

addressing the real problem here,

which everyone agrees is Saddam Hussein

himself. That broader strategy

might consist of a series of actions

that would destabilize his regime,

would put more pressure on him and

would eventually perhaps result in a

replacement of his Government, not by

assassination, which is contrary to

American policy, but by means of the

assistance of the people of Iraq.

Since the agreement by the U.N. Secretary

General, the need for a resolution

from the Congress supporting

military action has been, in effect, put

on hold, but I suggest that it is only on

hold, that there will come a time, sooner

or later, when the United Nations

will, again, be faced with the question,

and the United States as the primary

actor here, as to whether or not it is

necessary to take some additional action.

As sure as we are here today, Mr.

President, the Iraqis will violate the

terms of either the most recently

agreed-upon regime for inspection or

the remaining principles of inspection

which apply to other than the so-called

eight Presidential sites in Iraq. That

would probably happen if, that is to

say, we begin again to get warm, if our

inspectors find something that they

want to get into further.

At that point, we will begin to again

see denial and deception by the Iraqi

Government. At that point, it is going

to be relevant again whether or not the

American people, the world community

and the Congress support action by the

administration to deal with the then

most recent crisis. If the administration

has developed a broad strategy,

the bombing campaign only being a

part of that strategy, and everyone recognizing

that it by itself is not going

to solve the problem, but as a part of

an overall strategy can contribute to a

solution, then the President, I think,

will have the support he needs to proceed

with the execution of that plan.

But the development of that plan is

critical, and that is why I think during

this interregnum, this period in which

at least nominally inspections will be

permitted and pressure of immediate

military action has receded, it is important

for us in the Congress to work

with the administration to help it develop

the outlines of such a policy.

That is not our job, and I don’t suggest

that the Congress be the one to develop

that broad strategy. That is the administration’s

prerogative; it is the administration’s

responsibility. It is its responsibility,

and because many in Congress

feel the administration has abdicated

a significant part of that responsibility

in the past, I think we have the

opportunity and we have the responsibility

to share ideas with the administration

that it could put together in

a broader strategy. If it does that, it

will have the support of the Congress if

and when that time comes. That is why

I think it is important for us to talk a

little bit about the agreement that was

entered into and about some alternative

proposals that have been suggested,

including one which I will submit

for the RECORD. A letter sent to

the President by 28 prominent—prominent—

American citizens offers their

suggestions as to what might be done,

most of which have also been offered by

Members of the Senate.

Before I close with that, let me indicate

that when the majority leader

took the floor last week to criticize the

agreement that had been entered into

between the Secretary General and

Saddam Hussein, I supported the remarks

that he gave and I have said

that ever since, because I think some

criticism of this agreement is warranted.

It is a fact that our Government was

put in a box when the President and

the Secretary of State, in effect, ceded

this element of policy to the United

Nations. It was a foregone conclusion

we would have to then accept the

agreement and attempt to abide by it;

we had no choice at that point; and as

a result, the administration has to go

forward with it and has to nominally

at least support it. Richard Butler, the

chief inspector, has to support it. He is

a man of significant qualifications and

eloquence. In describing how this is

going to work, he says he can make it

work, but it is all predicated on the assumption

that Saddam Hussein will

abide by the agreement. That is what

Richard Butler himself says.

There are a lot of criticisms of the

agreement, about the precedent that it

sets, about the fact that it puts the

United Nations literally in the driver’s

seat and reduces the UNSCOM inspectors,

the professionals, and the United

States, which has been a primary country

backing the agreement, to a secondary

position. There has been significant

question about whether the inspections

themselves will be compromised

by the inclusion of a lot of

diplomats which are essentially to act

as chaperones to the inspectors at

these eight Presidential sites.

Part of the problem of the inspections

is that Saddam Hussein has always

seemed to have been aware of

where we wanted to go and has been

one step ahead of us. That is because

his Government has significantly penetrated

the operations and has information

in advance of the inspections. If

the diplomats are involved in this, and

some of them are from countries which

are clearly supportive of the Iraqi regime,

it certainly is open to question

as to whether or not the inspections

will be compromised in the future.

So a lot of questions that the majority

leader raised about this agreement,

I think, remain as significant and

ought to instruct us in the future as to

how not to go about business. But it is

done. And for the time being, we are

going to have to at least abide by it.

The key point about the agreement

that I think I will make is this: We

should have no illusions that it will be

abided by. At some point, the Iraqis

will, if we get close to finding something,

prevent either the full inspection

under the new agreement or revert

to form under the current policies that

apply to all of the sites other than the

eight Presidential sites. In either case,

we have the responsibility to act.

Now, the administration has the view

that this will actually make it easier

for us to engage in military action in

the future because in the past we did

not have support from the world community,

but this time if Saddam Hussein

violates it, the world community

will be with us. Well, unfortunately,

the world community appears to have

an almost infinite capacity for rationalization

not to take an action against

Saddam Hussein because we cannot

even get a resolution through the Security

Council that says the ‘‘severest’’

consequences will result from a violation

of the agreement. Instead, we

argue about words—of whether it will

be very severe consequences. This

clearly means that our allies are not

going to be backing us in terms of the

kind of military action that we will

want to take if and when that becomes

necessary.

So concluding on this point, Mr.

President, I think it is important for

us to look at some of the suggestions

that are being made and for the administration

to begin to develop this

broader policy.

I want to put two things in the

RECORD at this point. I will ask unanimous

consent to do so. One is a letter,

an open letter to the President, signed

by 28 prominent Americans, calling

upon the President to consider a variety

of specific actions that should be

taken; and the other is a statement by

Paul Wolfowitz who is the Dean of the

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced

International Studies at Johns Hopkins

University for the House Committee

on International Relations on February

24. Since that was a House hearing,

I thought it would useful for our

Members here in the Senate to have it.

So I ask unanimous consent that

those two documents be printed in the

RECORD.

There being no objection, the material

was ordered to be printed in the

RECORD, as follows:

Now, this document that

the 28 advisers—let me indicate who

some of these people are, people like

former Secretary of Defense Frank

Carlucci; and Caspar Weinberger; and

Judge William Clark, former National

Security Adviser; Doug Feith, former

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense;

Fred C. Ikle, former Undersecretary of

Defense; Bill Kristol; Robert Kagan;

Bernard Lewis; Don Rumsfeld, former

Secretary of Defense; and Paul

Wolfowitz, as I said; and Richard Perle.

They are all, I think, eminently qualified

to offer this kind of advice.

I urge the President to consider the

suggestions that are made here, which

revolve around preliminarily the principle

that military action alone will

not force Saddam to comply, that he is

the problem, that is, no coup d’etat is

likely to succeed in this country and

therefore the way to get him out is to

create a series of conditions which will

enable the Iraqi people themselves to

provide the insurrection that will eventually

depose him. This might include

the following:

Recognizing a provincial government;

restoring safe-haven both in the

northern and southern portions of Iraq

so that the people there can actually

declare themselves free of his influence

and control; lifting the sanctions in

those areas so that the people can benefit

from the economic end, of course,

that would result; release frozen Iraqi

assets to the Iraqis in exile; facilitating

broadcasts from U.S. transmitters

to the people of Iraq; removing vestiges

of Saddam’s ‘‘legitimacy’’ by considering,

for example, whether the United

Nations should indict him as a war

criminal; an air campaign could be a

part of this, launched against the Republican

Guard divisions which prop

him up; and tightening down on the

embargo.

Right now we know the sanctions are

of primary concern to him. And if we

tighten down on the embargo so that

the black market oil sales cannot continue

to provide him with significant

oil revenues, it will squeeze him further.

All of these things could eventually

create conditions under which the Iraqi

people could retake the Government of

Iraq from Saddam Hussein.

So, Mr. President, my concluding

point is this: The administration now

has some time to develop a strategy

which had not been developed prior to

the time that it was asking for Congress

to support a bombing campaign.

If that program is developed, with the

help of the Congress—and it makes

sense as a broad strategy to deal with

Saddam Hussein—the President will

have all of the authority and the backing

that he needs and deserves in taking

action against Saddam Hussein, I

would say, when, not if, that is called

for, as a result of probable Iraqi violation

of some part of the international

inspection regime.

It is a serious business, Mr. President,

for us to decide to move beyond a

policy of containment to a policy of

rollback. It is one which ought to be

debated by this body and by the administration.

But the time for it has come

because, as we have seen, neither the

American people nor the Congress were

willing to support a half-measures kind

of action against Saddam Hussein. We

felt something more was required to

really deal with the problem.

As we learned in Vietnam, and as we

have learned elsewhere, halfway measures—

calibrated bombing attacks, and

the like—do not seem to solve the

problem. When you go to war, I think

the maxim from the gulf war, from the

Vietnam war, and the new thinking of

military strategists in this country is:

When you go to war, you’d better mean

it; you have to be able to succeed at

what you are doing.

That probably requires the imposition

of overwhelming force and it requires

a broad strategy that will get

you where you are going. That is why

the administration needs to develop

this policy, with the assistance of the

Congress, and be able to implement it

if and when the time for action comes.

Mr. President, I ask, how much of

that remaining time do I have, because

I have one more thing I would like to

say?

Fine. Mr. President, I know

I can conclude these remarks in the

time allotted.

Mr. President, I want to change the

subject in this remaining 2 or 3 minutes

to discuss the issue of balancing

the budget for American families.